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Eurobonds	(or	coronabonds)	would	not	be	costly	for
Northern	euro	area	countries
There	are	currently	heated	debates	on	eurobonds,	partly	with	the	name	coronabonds.	This	topic	is	also	on	the
agenda	again	for	the	next	EU	and	euro	area	meetings.	Some	countries,	which	have	to	pay	relatively	high	interest
rates	on	their	government	debt,	demand	the	issuance	of	such	bonds,	most	notably	Italy,	understandably	assuming
that	such	bonds	would	reduce	their	financing	costs	(which	would	help	to	fight	the	outbreak	of	Covid-19	and	to
restart	the	economy	thereafter).
Countries	with	low	financing	costs,	such	as	Austria,	Finland,	Germany	and	especially	the	Netherlands,	thus	far
oppose	eurobonds.	However,	the	fears	in	those	countries	(of	having	to	take	over	the	debt	of	other	countries	in	the
case	of	a	default	and	of	increased	own	borrowing	costs	when	issuing	bonds	jointly	with	“weaker”	countries)	are
often	informed	by	false	argumentation.	In	fact,	if	the	eurobonds	are	designed	well,	their	issuance	will	hardly	cost
Northern	countries	anything.
Design	of	the	eurobonds/coronabonds
It	is	important	to	clarify	a	few	important	design	features	that	such	bonds	should	have.	First,	there	should	be	a	limit
on	the	amount	of	debt	that	a	country	can	create	via	these	eurobonds.	This	makes	sure	that	the	effect	on	other	euro
area	countries	would	be	limited	if	a	country	defaulted	on	its	eurobonds	(in	fact,	the	risk	that	a	default	happens	can
be	excluded	almost	entirely,	as	described	below).	If	the	bonds	are	now	issued	as	coronabonds,	meaning	that	their
main	aim	is	to	help	countries	deal	with	this	crisis,	a	possible	limit	could	be	between	10	and	25	per	cent	of	GDP.
With	such	a	relatively	low	limit,	the	coronabonds	would	be	a	good	trial	balloon	–	if	the	bonds	are	then	deemed	to	be
a	success	by	all,	regular	eurobonds	could	be	issued,	for	instance	up	to	60	per	cent	of	GDP	for	each	country.
Second,	there	should	be	sanctions	when	countries	default	on	this	debt.	Such	sanctions	could,	for	example,	be	that
a	country	defaulting	on	the	eurobond	debt	loses	its	voting	rights	in	the	EU	(a	more	drastic	sanction	would	be	that	a
default	automatically	triggers	article	51	without	the	right	to	revoke	it	–	a	defaulting	country	would	then	be	forced	to
leave	the	EU,	but	such	severe	sanctions	may	seem	unnecessarily	harsh	and	may	not	even	be	credible).	With
serious	sanctions	and	a	limit	to	the	debt	via	eurobonds,	no	government	would	default	on	this	debt	–	assuming	that
the	bonds	are	there	permanently,	countries	could	easily	roll	this	debt	over	with	new	eurobonds	(countries	may	still
default	on	their	regular	government	debt,	but	that	would	not	be	a	problem	for	the	eurobonds).
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Third,	the	debt	should	be	guaranteed	by	the	ECB	(the	bonds	could	be	directly	redeemed	by	the	ECB	at	maturity
and	the	ECB	could	then	receive	the	money	from	the	respective	country).	This	makes	sure	that	the	bonds	have	zero
default	risk	for	the	bondholders,	because	the	ECB	cannot	run	out	of	money.	In	the	theoretical	case	that	a	country
defaulted	on	this	debt,	bondholders	would	not	even	notice	it.	The	ECB	could	just	“print	the	money”	or	roll	over	the
bonds	eternally	or	until	the	moment	when	the	defaulting	country	comes	back	chastened	and	pays	back	the	debt.
This	also	shows	that	such	a	theoretical	default	would	not	trouble	other	governments’	finances:	they	would	not	have
to	cover	the	default.
Because	of	these	design	features,	the	eurobonds	would	be	different	from	loans	via	the	European	Stability
Mechanism	(ESM)	–	the	eurobonds	bring	much	less	risky	for	both	bondholders	and	euro	area	countries	(the	ESM
may	still	be	useful	now	to	help	the	most	troubled	countries	fast,	as	setting	up	eurobonds	would	take	some	time).
The	eurobonds	would	also	be	different	from	the	ECB	just	guaranteeing	all	government	debt	by	euro	area	countries
in	general,	because	with	eurobonds	there	is	a	limit	up	to	which	the	bonds	are	guaranteed	and	a	clear	distinction	is
made	between	eurobonds	and	regular	sovereign	bonds	(if	the	ECB	just	guaranteed	all	government	debt,	there
would	be	the	danger	that	a	country	could	make	excessive	debt	and	then	default,	so-called	moral	hazard,	something
that	cannot	happen	with	the	proposed	design	of	eurobonds).
The	third	point	means	that	the	ECB	would	be	a	lender	of	last	resort	in	the	eurobond	market.	The	role	of	lender	of
last	resort	in	the	sovereign	debt	market	is	an	important	role	that	central	banks	in	general	have,	but	which	is	missing
in	the	current	setup	of	the	European	Monetary	Union.	For	central	banks	of	countries	outside	of	monetary	unions,	it
implies	that	sovereign	debt	issued	in	the	country’s	own	currency	has	a	default	risk	of	close	to	zero,	because	the
central	bank	could	always	serve	the	debt	by	printing	money;	this	may	in	general	be	inflationary,	but	for	bondholders
this	situation	is	much	better	than	an	actual	default	(note	that	the	absence	of	default	risk	can	only	translate	into	low
interest	rates	if	inflation	risk	is	also	low,	something	that	is	the	case	in	the	euro	area;	also	note	that	good	financing
conditions	are	important	for	all	countries	but	even	more	for	countries	in	a	currency	union	where	fiscal	policy	is	a
particularly	important	stabilisation	tool).
It	is	in	general	implicitly	assumed	that	national	central	banks	assume	the	role	of	lender	of	last	resort	in	the
sovereign	debt	market	–	after	all,	a	national	central	bank	is	the	institution	of	a	country,	no	matter	how	independent	it
may	seem.	The	flaw	in	the	current	design	of	the	euro	area,	that	countries	do	not	have	such	a	lender	of	last	resort,
would	thus	be	at	least	partially	eliminated.	The	implicit	function	of	the	central	bank	being	a	lender	of	last	resort
would	be	made	an	explicit	function,	but	with	a	pre-specified	limit	up	to	which	the	ECB	would	and	could	do	this.
Costs	to	Northern	euro	area	countries
In	addition	to	the	fear	of	an	actual	default	(which	is	unjustified	as	explained	above),	another	fear	of	Northern
countries	is	that	their	own	funding	costs	would	increase	in	response	to	having	joint	bonds	with	countries	with
currently	higher	financing	costs.	This	might	be	due	to	some	erroneous	thinking	that	the	yield	on	the	eurobonds
would	be	some	kind	of	weighted	average	of	countries’	current	bond	yields.	Such	thinking	is	wrong:	the	yields	of
eurobonds	would	be	determined	by	the	demand	for	euro-denominated	bonds	without	default	risk	(to	be	precise,	by
demand	and	supply,	but	the	supply	would	be	limited	at	a	certain	level	of	GDP,	so	that	the	determination	of	the	price
would	de	facto	be	determined	by	the	demand	for	the	bonds	alone).
It	is	not	possible	to	state	exactly	how	costly	or	beneficial	the	introduction	of	eurobonds	would	be	for	Northern
countries,	but	it	is	possible	to	get	a	good	idea.	I	will	focus	on	Germany	here,	as	the	country	with	the	lowest
financing	costs	and	as	the	largest	EU	country,	but	the	same	argument	can	be	applied	to	other	countries,	including
Austria,	Finland,	and	The	Netherlands.	While	one	cannot	observe	a	demand	curve	for	safe	euro-denominated
bonds,	it	is	possible	to	observe	a	lower	bound	for	such	a	demand	curve.	This	lower	bound	can	be	obtained	by
looking	at	the	cumulative	government	debt	of	eurozone	countries	and	their	bond	yields,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.
Figure	1.	Cumulative	euro	area	debt	and	bond	yields
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Notes:	Bonds	have	a	residual	maturity	of	10	years	(average	March	2	to	April	2,	2020;	ThomsonReuters).	Using	10-year	bonds	is
reasonable	as	the	average	term	to	maturity	of	outstanding	government	debt	is	not	much	lower	(ca.	8	years	for	OECD	countries)	and
the	data	are	easily	available.	Data	on	Cumulative	debt	and	GDP	are	current	estimates	of	nominal	values	for	2019	(ThomsonReuters).
Estonia	is	excluded	as	its	yields	are	not	available.
Standard	demand	curves	have	prices	on	the	vertical	and	quantities	on	the	horizontal	axis.	When	considering	bonds,
it	is	often	more	convenient	to	consider	yields	(interest	rates)	rather	than	bond	prices	(of	course,	these	are	just	mirror
images	of	one	another).	The	figure	shows	long-term	bond	yields	on	the	vertical	axis,	with	an	inverted	scale:	high
yields,	which	correspond	to	low	bond	prices,	are	shown	at	the	bottom,	while	low	yields,	which	correspond	to	high
bond	prices,	are	shown	at	the	top.	On	the	horizontal	axis	is	the	cumulative	debt	by	euro	area	countries.	The	dots	in
the	graph	correspond	to	euro	area	countries’	bond	yields	and	government	debt	issued	in	the	euro	area	at	the	same
or	lower	yields.	Thus,	the	dot	for	the	Netherlands	shows	the	bond	yield	on	Dutch	long-term	government	bonds	on
the	vertical	axis	and	eurozone	government	debt	that	is	considered	to	be	equally	safe	or	safer	on	the	horizontal	axis
(in	this	case	the	debt	of	Germany,	Luxembourg,	and	the	Netherlands	combined).
This	can	be	used	to	construct	a	lower	bound	of	the	demand	curve	of	safe	bonds.	We	observe	the	bond	yield	of
German	bonds;	this	yield	must	thus	lie	on	the	demand	curve	for	German	bonds.	We	do	not	observe	German	bond
yields	at	a	higher	quantity,	but	we	observe	the	yields	of	other	bonds	that	are	considered	less	safe.	Taking	the	bonds
with	the	second-lowest	yield,	Luxembourgish	bonds,	we	can	infer	that	the	yield	of	German	bonds,	if	all
Luxembourgish	bonds	were	replaced	by	German	bonds,	would	be	at	most	what	the	yield	of	Luxembourgish	bonds
is	now.	What	the	black	line,	connecting	all	the	dots,	thus	shows	is	a	lower	bound	of	the	demand	curve	for	bonds
with	the	risk	of	German	government	bonds,	which	is	naturally	also	a	lower	bound	for	bonds	with	even	lower	risk,
such	as	the	proposed	eurobonds.
It	seems	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	kinks	that	can	be	observed	in	the	black	line	connecting	the	dots	are	not
present	in	the	demand	curve	for	safe	assets	(rather,	these	kinks	seem	to	reflect	changes	in	risk	levels).	To	work
with	a	linear	function,	the	blue	dashed	line	is	the	steepest	possible	straight	line	that	crosses	the	observation	for
Germany	and	that	is	nowhere	below	the	observation	for	another	country.	This	line	can	be	considered	a	lower	bound
of	the	demand	curve	for	eurobonds	(in	the	picture,	the	line	touches	the	observation	for	France,	which	faces	higher
interest	rates	than	Germany	–	if	the	interest	rate	is	higher	because	French	government	bonds	are	riskier,	the	actual
demand	line	for	the	safe	assets	would	lie	above	the	blue	dashed	line).	If	one	entered	eurobonds	in	this	graph,	they
would	be	the	safest	and	thus	the	leftmost	assets,	the	other	bonds	would	accordingly	shift	to	the	right.	The	blue
dashed	line	could	then	be	used	to	calculate	changes	in	bond	yields	in	response	to	the	introduction	of	eurobonds	in
this	“worst-case”	scenario.
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Assuming	that	each	country	can	create	debt	via	eurobonds	up	to	25%	of	GDP,	German	10-year	interest	rates
would	rise	from	about	-0.4	to	about	-0.1	and	only	to	about	-0.3	if	the	debt	limit	is	at	10%	of	GDP.	These	interest
rates	can	be	found	in	the	graph	where	the	two	right	vertical	red	dashed	lines	intersect	with	the	blue	dashed	line	(the
yield	for	German	bonds	would	lie	on	the	blue	dashed	line,	above	the	value	on	the	horizontal	axis	corresponding	to
the	total	amount	of	outstanding	eurobonds	and	German	bonds).
Increases	in	interest	rates	from	-.4	to	-.3	(eurobonds	up	to	10%	of	GDP)	or	to	-0.1	(up	to	25%)	for	Germany	are
exaggerating	the	problem	in	terms	of	financing	costs	for	Germany	for	a	variety	of	reasons.	First,	as	already
discussed,	the	blue	dashed	demand	curve	is	a	lower	bound	for	such	a	demand	curve	as	the	dots	in	the	graph
represent	more	and	more	risk,	the	further	one	moves	to	the	right.	Second,	even	Germany	may	in	general	default	on
its	debt	–	it	is	unlikely,	but	even	this	debt	is	not	as	safe	as	an	ECB	guarantee.	This	is	another	reason	why	the
demand	for	eurobonds	should	lie	above	the	blue	dashed	line	in	the	graph.
Third,	for	the	calculations	it	is	assumed	that	Germany	makes	use	of	its	limit	of	eurobonds	in	addition	to	all	current
debt	–	in	general,	if	Germany	makes	use	of	the	eurobonds,	it	would	have	to	issue	less	regular	debt,	which	would
lead	to	a	smaller	change	in	interest	rates.	Fourth,	such	bonds	would	be	safe	assets	with	high	liquidity,	which	would
make	these	bonds	attractive	to	central	banks,	sovereign	wealth	funds,	and	pension	funds	worldwide.	In	the
markets,	there	is	a	premium	for	highly	liquid	assets	(one	can	argue	that	the	reason	why	German	bonds	have	lower
yields	than	Austrian,	Dutch,	Finnish,	or	Luxembourgish	bonds	is	exactly	that	they	are	more	liquid,	because
Germany	is	larger).	Similar	to	the	US,	which	has	been	reaping	the	benefits	of	its	reserve-currency	status	and
borrowed	at	cheaper	rates	than	it	otherwise	would	have,	the	euro	area	may	then	also	benefit	from	such	a	special
status,	of	course	at	a	smaller	scale.
In	fact,	some	scholars	argue	that	the	reason	why	the	euro	is	being	used	so	little	internationally	and	“punching	below
its	weight”	is	precisely	that	there	are	no	eurozone-wide	safe	and	liquid	assets.	Taking	these	four	points	together,
even	a	deterioration	of	financing	conditions	for	Northern	euro	area	countries	of	30	basis	points	in	response	to
coronabonds	with	a	limit	of	25%	of	GDP	seems	too	pessimistic	–	such	bonds	would	most	likely	cost	these	countries
nothing	at	all,	the	countries	might	even	benefit	from	them.
Concluding	remarks
Discussions	about	eurobonds	often	seem	to	be	driven	more	by	emotions	than	by	reason,	both	in	the	North	of
Europe	and	in	the	South.	In	the	North,	there	seem	to	be	excessive	fears	of	defaults	by	other	countries	and	of
increased	borrowing	costs	for	themselves.	As	discussed	above,	these	fears	are	irrational	if	the	eurobonds	are
designed	well.	In	the	South,	in	particular	in	Italy,	eurobonds	seem	to	be	equated	with	solidarity	in	this	devastating
health	crisis.	This	is	equally	false,	for	two	reasons.	First,	this	is	a	bad	measure	of	European	solidarity	precisely
because	the	discussion	in	the	North	is	often	driven	by	bad	arguments.	Taking	Germany	as	an	example	again,	there
is	a	strong	feeling	of	solidarity	toward	the	most	hard-hit	regions	in	Europe.	This	has	not	(yet?)	materialised	in	the
government’s	acceptance	of	eurobonds,	but	it	materialises	in	treating	French	and	Italian	patients	in	German
hospitals	and	in	sending	tons	of	materials	to	other	EU	countries,	especially	to	Italy	(including	hundreds	of	medical
ventilators).	The	German	government	also	initiated	and	supported	different	measures	to	alleviate	the	financial
troubles	of	the	most	hard-hit	countries,	such	as	using	the	ESM	for	funding	without	conditionality,	using	the
European	Investment	Bank	to	support	enterprises,	and	founding	a	European	short-term	unemployment	insurance
scheme.
However,	such	support	is	overshadowed	by	the	discussions	about	eurobonds	(I	would	still	argue	that	there	should
be	more	help,	but	the	PR	that	the	present	within-EU	support	has	received	is	unjustly	negative	–	in	contrast	to
Russia’s	PR,	where	a	positive	image	was	created	with	a	bit	of	mainly	useless	material).	Second,	while	the
introduction	of	eurobonds	would	be	preferable	over	ESM	funding	(in	particular	in	the	long	run	–	eurobonds,	with
their	advantages,	would	be	there	to	stay,	whereas	later	refinancing	of	ESM	loans	is	unclear),	the	difference	for	the
ability	to	fight	this	crisis	in	the	hardest-hit	countries	in	the	short	run	would	only	be	modest	(if	only	few	countries
made	use	of	ESM	loans;	also	with	ESM	loans,	their	rates	would	be	much	below	their	current	rates).
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To	sum	up,	the	Northern	countries	should	give	up	their	rejection	of	eurobonds.	Such	bonds	are	economically	a
good	idea	if	they	are	well	designed.	Coronabonds,	where	such	bonds	are	issued	as	soon	as	possible	up	to	a
relatively	low	limit	of	10	to	25%	of	GDP,	would	be	a	good	test	of	market	reactions.	If	they	are	a	success,	it	will	easily
be	possible	to	allow	for	eurobonds	up	to	a	higher	limit,	for	example	60%	of	GDP.	While	the	bonds	are	a	good	idea,
it	should	be	clear	that	they	would	only	be	a	small	part	of	the	needed	response	to	the	current	health	and	economic
crisis.
The	author	would	like	to	thank	Martin	Brown,	Olimpia	Carradori,	Domenico	Massaro,	and	Johannes	Vatter	for
comments	and	suggestions.
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